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DRAFT No. 2
25 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director/Intelligence

SUBJECT: Recommended Procedures for ~~Selection~~
~~and~~ Labeling of NPIC Briefing Boards

1. In accordance with your instructions of 5 April, a group of representatives of DD/I offices (NPIC, ORR, OCI, OSI) was called together by the undersigned. The group has had a number of meetings and a tour of NPIC. The following recommendations represent the agreed views of the group.

BACKGROUND

2. Under present procedures a combined CIA/DIA team *of photo interpreters* reviews the film from which briefing boards are to be derived. This may take place either before the start of the mission readout or concurrently with the readout, which normally begins at 0800. When it precedes the readout, all night or early morning exercises are frequently necessary in order to have the boards ready by 0800. The actual selection of board subjects is made by the NPIC mission coordinators, under ~~each of~~ whom a number of PI teams work. Selection is ^{*normally*} based on the COMOR
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target list as well as on quality of coverage. To this point generally three to eight days have elapsed since completion of the mission (Cuba is an obvious exception).

3. ~~The relative priorities of the subject matter~~ ^{Subject} for the boards are recommended by the Collateral Support Division/NPIC, ^{Tech. & prod. personnel,} ~~reviewed by~~ senior photo interpreters, and finally by Director/NPIC.

4. In preparation for his briefings, the Director/NPIC discusses the targets with the senior OAK coordinator and with the Collateral Support Division/NPIC. The latter supplies cards containing reviews of previous coverage and ^{some} relevant collateral information on each target. Labels are then decided upon. In accordance with DCI instructions these boards, when approved by Director/NPIC and completed in two copies, are released simultaneously for briefing of DCI and Director, DIA.

5. In this rapid processing, DD/I analysts are not normally involved. ~~Under this time schedule~~ ^{written} there is little opportunity for consultation and there is little material for review. ~~Usually the~~ ^{usually is called upon to} Director/NPIC ^{thus the} gives his briefing to the DCI before either boards or texts have been seen by DD/I analysts or the heads of DD/I offices. ~~All such review normally takes place several hours later.~~

DISCUSSION

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DISCUSSION

6. The schedule outlined above poses several problems. *The preliminary views expressed in the briefing have relative to the accuracy of reporting and the relationship of at times been inaccurate, of the photography has not yet been fully related to other kinds of intelligence. Such visual evidence has tremendous impact on high officials and considering that may have considerable* detailed photo interpretation and analysis in depth may be some time in coming, any misconception may be difficult to correct if in fact opportunity to do so ever arises. In CIA, no other source material is presented to such a high level without the benefit of all-source analysis.

7. ~~7.~~ (See Proposed Paragraph 7 by ORR - attached)

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~~8.~~ Present NPIC procedures have evolved over a period of nearly seven years of activity. At the beginning, the immediate threat from the USSR was keenly felt and the NPIC briefing provided a useful introduction to new data. Increasingly, however, files of collateral data as well as photo interpretation have been built up on many strategic targets, particularly in the USSR, so that the need for the quick preview has diminished. In the case of other areas, such as Communist China, the urgency of the strategic threat is significantly less. Furthermore, collateral information is often lacking or scarce and, therefore,

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it may take some time to arrive at a ^{provide an ~~initial~~ analysis of the significance} valid interpretation of a target. Under present conditions, in the cases of both the USSR and Communist China, a delay of a few hours or more in the interpretation of strategic targets is unlikely to have adverse effects; yet may significantly increase the chances of accurate assessment of the new information.

8. The short time schedule on which NPIC presently is required to produce its briefing boards may lead to the erroneous conclusion that what is being shown are the most significant intelligence results of the mission. Such results can be determined only after some degree of analysis has been performed on all of the various targets covered in the mission. ^{only limited} Since time does not permit any analysis to be done prior to the first briefing presentation, the choice of briefing board items must necessarily be based on an arbitrary and somewhat random selection by NPIC personnel. Selection of briefing board items are often determined more by quality and availability of the raw data rather than intelligence importance. In the past, attempts by NPIC personnel to perform even superficial analysis on key briefing board items have frequently resulted in incorrect assessment.

Time does not even allow a preliminary readout of some of the more complex targets. For example, Mission 9053 provided



~~the best coverage of Tyura Tam rangehead obtained in years. Although a briefing board on this target was prepared, a preliminary readout on this facility could not be reported until the third OAK reporting period, due to its complexity.~~

10. Despite the necessities of life under a national charter, there appears to be sufficient flexibility of operation at NPIC to accomodate some changes. The assets of the CIA departmental contingent, the Photo Interpretation Division (PID), could be employed to ensure response to the needs of the Agency for immediate reporting in greater depth than is now the case with the joint CIA/DIA teams. PID could provide PI support on further analysis of targets screened by the OAK teams each day. DIA would be free under this procedure to follow suit or make other arrangements to meet its current intelligence needs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. The working group recommends modification of present procedures as follows:

- a. Except in the case of new developments of overriding significance, all final ^{review} ~~selections~~ of material for briefing boards and their labeling be ¹⁵⁰⁰ ~~1600~~ deferred until ~~1600~~ hours on each day of the OAK or

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(except Cuba)

IPIR exercise so that the PI results of the exercise can be used in this process.

b. A DD/I analyst be designated DD/I coordinator ^{this review} for each OAK or IPIR exercise and work with PIR ?

to produce the best all-source interpretation

possible within the limited time available. ^{DIA will probably} The

wish to establish a similar function.

DD/I coordinator would be authorized to contact

ORR, OCI, and OSI analysts as required for consultation.

DD/I analysts be called in by the DD/I coordinator to participate in the ^{review as required.} ~~selection of source~~ ?

~~material, the labeling of source, and the preparation~~

~~boards of briefing notes as required. Their inputs would~~

~~be made through the CIA Departmental Consultant,~~


~~the Photo Interpretation Division (PID) of NSA.~~

d. Textual material resulting from this

^{by the DD/I coordinator} exercise be furnished to OCI along with copies

satisfactory photo copies of these boards are to be ^{for forwarding to DP, OS} *on*

~~briefings and publications.~~



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PROPOSED PARAGRAPH 7 BY ORR

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7. In effect, the immediacy with which reporting on all new photographic missions is currently handled is similar to that normally afforded only indications intelligence, where the need for quick reporting outweighs the inherent dangers of superficial, single-source analysis. In the past, the simplicity of the major intelligence problems (e.g., did the Soviets have deployed ICBM's or didn't they?) and the immediate political consequences of the answer to ^{such} this problem may have warranted the immediate reporting of ^{preliminary} ~~raw~~ photographic ^{interpretations} intelligence. Today, however, our knowledge of current ^{soviet} bloc strategic capabilities is much greater and consequently the strategic intelligence problem is neither so simple nor so immediate. ^{* in either case} The current situation, therefore, does not justify ^{preliminary photographic} ~~insisting on the timeliness of raw reporting~~ on strategic matters. ~~by a few hours at the expense of an all-source evaluation,~~ ^{for the} ~~purpose~~

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